We investigate similarities and differencies between systems of many interacting players maximizing their individual payoffs and particles minimizing their interaction energy.
Introduction
Socio-economic systems can be viewed as systems of many interacting agents or players. We may then try to derive their global behavior from individual interactions between their basic entities.
Such approach is fundamental in statistical physics which deals with systems of many interacting particles. We will explore similarities and differences between systems of many interacting players maximizing their individual payoffs and particles minimizing their interaction energy.
In particular, we will address the problem of equilibrium selection in games with multiple strict Nash equilibria. We will consider spatial games with players located on vertices of the square lattice and interacting with their nearest neighbors. In discrete moments of time, players adapt to their neighbors by choosing with a high probability the strategy which is the best response, i.e. the one which maximizes the sum of the payoffs obtained from individual stage games. With a small probability, representing the noise of the system, they make mistakes. To describe the long-run behavior of such stochastic dynamics, Foster and Young [1] introduced a concept of stochastic stability. It was then shown in Kandori-Mailath-Rob [2] and Young [3] models that in games with two strict Nash equilibria, the so-called risk-dominant one [4] is stochastically stable; see however [5, 6, 7] for models with different behavior.
A configuration of strategies (an assignment of pure strategies to players) is stochastically stable if it has a positive probability in the stationary state of the above dynamics in the zero-noise limit, that is zero probability of mistakes. It means that in the long run we observe it with a positive frequency. However, for any arbitrarily low but fixed noise, if the number of players is big enough, the probability of any individual configuration is practically zero. It might happen that for a large number of players, to observe a stochastically stable configuration we must assume that players make mistakes with extremely small probabilities. This means that players play virtually pure strategies, i.e., best responses. As indicated by van Damme and Weibull [8] , a small probability of mistakes should involve some cost "to control the trembling hand". It may also be interpreted as a cost of learning strategies played by neighbors. To avoid paying these prohibitively big costs, players settle for regimes with low but not extremely low noise. On the other hand, it may happen that in the long run, for a low but fixed noise and sufficiently big number of players, the stationary state is highly concentrated on an ensemble consisting of one Nash configuration and its small perturbations, i.e. configurations, where most players play the same strategy. We will call such configurations ensemble stable. We will show that these two stability concepts do not necessarily coincide.
As we already mentioned, in certain stochastic models of games with two strategies, the risk-dominant one is stochastically stable. In games with three or more strategies, the situation is far more interesting and complex. Already in his paper [3] Young presented an example of a game with three strategies, where a pairwise risk-dominant strategy was not stochastically stable. Spatial games with three or more strategies were studied by Blume [9] and Ellison [10, 11] .
Blume used concepts and techniques of statistical mechanics of interacting particles. He considered infinite systems (the limit of the infinite number of players) and obtained some sufficient conditions for stochastic stability. Ellison [11] provided the general approach to stochastic stability and proved that the so-called globally risk-dominant strategy [12] is stochastically stable in spatial games with the nearest-neighbor interactions on the square lattice.
We will consider here only the so-called potential games [13] with three strategies, i.e., with payoff functions given by 3x3 symmetric matrices. It means that for any given strategy profile, payoffs of all players are the same. This is in absolute analogy to systems of interacting particles, where instead of maximizing payoffs, particles minimize their interaction energy. We will exploit this analogy to describe long-run behavior of games with three strict Nash equilibria.
We will present examples of spatial games with three strategies where concepts of stochastic stability and ensemble stability do not coincide. In particular, we may have the situation, where a globally risk-dominant and Pareto-efficient strategy, which is stochastically stable, is played in the long run with an arbitrarily low frequency. Such behavior is fairly generic; it occurs for open sets of parameters of a payoff matrix of a stage game. To show our results we use methods of statistical mechanics.
In Section 2, we introduce stochastic dynamics in spatial games with local interactions. In Section 3, we review the basic concepts of statistical mechanics of systems of many interacting particles. Risk-dominance and stochastic stability in games with multiple strict Nash equilibria is discussed in Section 4. In Section 5, we introduce our concept of ensemble stability and present examples of games where stochastically stable Nash configurations are played in the long run with arbitrarily small probabilities if the noise level is low and the number of players is big enough. In Section 6, we discuss an effect of adding a strictly dominated strategy to a game with two strategies. In particular, the presence of such a strategy may cause a risk and payoff-dominant strategy to be observed in the long run with a frequency close to zero.
Discussion follows in Section 7.
Spatial Games with Local Interactions
Let Λ be a finite subset of the simple lattice Z 2 (we may think about a square centered at the origin of the lattice). Every site of Λ is occupied by one player who has at his disposal one of k different pure strategies. Let S be a set of pure strategies, then Ω Λ = S Λ is the set of all possible configurations of players, that is all possible assignments of pure strategies to individual players. For every i ∈ Λ, X i is the strategy of the i−th player in the configuration X ∈ Ω Λ and X −i denotes strategies of all remaining players; X therefore can be represented as the pair (X i , X −i ). U : S × S → R is a matrix of payoffs of our stage game. U(A, B), A, B ∈ S is the payoff of the first (row) player playing the strategy A when the second one (a column player) is playing B. We will consider here only symmetric games so the payoff of the second player is given by U(B, A) (the payoff matrix of the second player is the transpose of the payoff matrix U of the first one). Every player interacts only with his neighbors and his payoff is the sum of the payoffs resulting from individual games. We assume that he has to use the same strategy for all neighbors. Let N i denote the neighborhood of the i−th player. For the nearest-neighbor interaction we have N i = {j; |j − i| = 1}, where |i − j| is the distance between i and j. For X ∈ Ω Λ we denote by ν i (X) the payoff of the i−th player in the configuration X:
In this paper we will discuss only coordination games, where there are k pure symmetric Nash equilibria and therefore k homogeneous Nash configurations, where all players play the same strategy.
We describe now the deterministic dynamics of the best-response rule. Namely, at each discrete moment of time t = 1, 2, ..., a randomly chosen player may update his strategy. He simply adopts the strategy, X t i , which gives him the maximal total payoff ν i (X Now we allow players to make mistakes with a small probability, that is to say they may not choose the best response. A probability of making a mistake may depend on the state of the system (a configuration of strategies of neighboring players). We will assume that this probability is a decreasing function of the payoff lost as a result of a mistake [9, 14] . In the log-linear rule, the probability of chosing by the i−th player the strategy X t i at time t is given by the following conditional probability:
where T > 0 measures the noise level.
Let us observe that if T → 0, p 
If X is stochastically stable, then the frequency of visiting X converges to a positive number along any time trajectory almost surely. It means that in the long run we observe X with a positive frequency. In most models it is usually equal to 1.
In examples below, we consider symmetric coordination games with symmetric Nash equilibria and homogeneous Nash configurations. By the stochastic stability of a strategy or a Nash equilibrium we mean the stochastic stability of the corresponding Nash configuration.
Lattice-Gas Models
We will present here one of the basic models of interacting particles. In classical lattice-gas models, particles occupy lattice sites and interact only with their neighbors. The fundamental concept is that of a ground-state configuration. It can be formulated conveniently in the limit of an infinite lattice (the infinite number of particles). Let us assume that every site of the Z 2 lattice can be occupied by one of k different particles. An infinite-lattice configuration is an assignment of particles to lattice sites, i.e., an element of Ω = {1, ..., k} Z 2 . If X ∈ Ω and i ∈ Z 2 , then we denote by X i a restriction of X to i. We will assume here that only nearest-neighbor particles interact. The energy of their interaction is given by a symmetric k × k matrix V . An element V (A, B) is the interaction energy of two nearest-neighbor particles of type A and B.
The total energy of a system in a configuration X in a finite region Λ can be then written as
For Y ∼ X the relative energy is defined by
where the summation is with respect to pairs of nearest neighbors on Z 2 . Observe that this is the finite sum; the energy difference between Y and X is equal to 0 outside some finite Λ.
That is, we cannot lower the energy of a ground-state configuration by changing it locally.
The energy density e(X) of a configuration X is e(X) = lim inf
where |Λ| is the number of lattice sites in Λ. It can be shown that any ground-state configuration has the minimal energy density. It means that local conditions present in the definition of a ground-state configuration force global minimization of the energy density.
As we see, the concept of a ground-state configuration is very similar to that of a Nash configuration. We have only to identify particles with agents, types of particles with strategies and instead of minimizing interaction energies we should maximize payoffs. There are however profound differences. First of all, ground-state configurations can be defined only for symmetric matrices; an interaction energy is assigned to a pair of particles, payoffs are assigned to individual players and may be different for each of them. Ground-state configurations are stable with respect to all local changes, Nash configurations are stable only with respect to one-player changes. It means that for the same symmetric matrix U, there may exist a configuration which is a Nash configuration but not a ground-state configuration for the interaction marix −U. The simplest example is given by the following matrix:
(A, A) and (B, B) are Nash configurations for a system consisting of two players but only (A, A) is a ground-state configuration for V = −U. We may therefore consider the concept of a ground-state configuration as a refinement of a Nash equilibrium.
For any classical lattice-gas model there exists at least one ground-state configuration. This can be seen in the following way. We start with an arbitrary configuration. If it cannot be changed locally to decrease its energy it is already a ground-state configuration. Otherwise we may change it locally and decrease the energy of the system. If our system is finite, then after a finite number of steps we arrive at a ground-state configuration; at every step we decrease the energy of the system and for every finite system its possible energies form a finite set. For an infinite system, we have to proceed ad infinitum converging to a ground-state configuration (this follows from the compactness of Ω). Game models are different. It may happen that a game with a nonsymmetric payoff matrix may not posess a Nash configuration. The classical example is that of the Rock-Scissors-Paper game given by the following matrix.
Example 2
One may show that this game dos not have any Nash configurations on Z and Z 2 but many Nash configurations on the triangular lattice.
In short, ground-state configurations minimize the total energy of a particle system, Nash configurations do not necessarily maximize the total payoff of a society.
Ground-state configuration is an equilibrium concept for systems of interacting particles at zero temperature. For positive temperatures, we must take into account fluctuations caused by thermal motions of particles. Equilibrium behavior of the system results then from the competition between its energy V and entropy S (which measures the number of configurations corresponding to a macroscopic state), i.e. the minimization of its free energy F = V − T S, where T is the temperature of the system -a measure of thermal motions. At the zero temperature, T = 0, the minimization of the free energy reduces to the minimization of the energy. This zero-temperature limit looks very similar to the zero-noise limit present in the definition of the stochastic stability. Equilibrium behavior of a system of interacting particles can be described by specifying probabilities of occurence for all particle configurations. More formally, it is described by a Gibbs state.
We construct it in the following way. Let Λ be a finite subset of Z 2 and µ T Λ the following probability mass function on Ω Λ = (1, ..., k) Λ :
for every X ∈ Ω Λ , where
is a normalizing factor and T is the temperature of the system.
We define a Gibbs state as a limit of µ T Λ as Λ → Z 2 . One can prove that a limit of a translation-invariant Gibbs state for a given interaction as T → 0 is a measure supported by ground-state configurations. One of the fundamental problems of statistical mechanics is a characterization of low-temperature Gibbs states for given interactions between particles.
One can show that for any finite Λ, µ T Λ is an stationary state for our log-linear dynamics with a symmetric payoff matrix −V [15] . We see that to analyze long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics it is essential to investigate Gibbs states of corresponding lattice gas-models. This is exactly an approach taken by Blume in [9] . We will exploit further this correspondence in The notion of risk-dominance was introduced and thoroughly studied by Harsanyi and Selten [4] . The general theory is based on the so-called tracing procedure. In symmetric two-player games with two strategies and two symmetric pure Nash equilibria, one can show that a strategy risk-dominates the other one if it has a higher expected payoff against a player playing both strategies with the probability 1/2. It follows that (A, Games with symmetric payoff matrices are called doubly symmetric or potential games [13] .
More generally, a game is called a potential game if its payoff matrix can be changed to a symmetric one by adding payoffs to its columns. As we know, such a payoff transformation does not change strategic character of the game, in particular it does not change the set of its equilibria and their stochastic stability. More formally, it means that there exists a symmetric matrix V called a potential of the game such that for any three strategies A, B, C ∈ S
It is easy to see that every game with two strategies has a potential V with V (A, A) = a − c, Let us now consider a corresponding spatial game with players located on a finite region Λ of the Z 2 lattice. It has two homogeneous Nash configurations, X A and X B , in which all players play the same strategy, correspondingly A or B.
If V is a potential of the stage game, then (i,j)∈Λ V (X i , X j ) is a potential of a configuration X in the corresponding spatial game. One can show [15] that
is the unique stationary state of the log-linear dynamics.
We may now explicitly perform the limit T → 0 and we obtain that the risk-dominant configuration X A is stochastically stable [15] . One may also arrive at this result using the tree analysis of Freidlin and Wentzell [17] as it was done in [2, 3] ; see also [10, 11] .
Let us now consider coordination games with three strategies and three symmetric pure Nash equilibria: (A, A), (B, B), and (C, C). One may wish to say that A risk dominates the other two strategies if it risk dominates them in pairwise comparisons. Of course it may happen that A dominates B, B dominates C, and finally C dominates A. But even if we do not have such a cyclic relation of dominance, a strategy which is pairwise risk-dominant may not be stochastically stable. Young presented an example of an adaptive play with such a property [3] .
A more relevant notion seems to be that of a global risk dominance [12] . We say that A is globally risk dominant if it is a best response to a mixed strategy which assigns probability 1/2 to A. For Young's adaptive play it was shown in [12] that a globally risk-dominant strategy is stochastically stable. Analogous result is true for spatial games with local interactions [10, 11] .
A different criterion for stochastic stability was developed by Blume [9] . He showed that in a coordination game with k strategies A i , i = 1, ..., k and k pure symmetric Nash equlibria, A 1 is stochastically stable if
We may observe that if A 1 satisfies the above condition, then it is pairwise risk dominant.
In the following section, we will examine if the above results hold if instead of performing the zero-noise limit we will, for any low but fixed noise, enlarge sufficiently the number of players.
Ensemble Stability
The concept of stochastic stability involves individual configurations of players. In the zeronoise limit, the stationary state is usually concentrated on one or at most few configurations.
However, for a low but fixed noise and for a big number of players, the probability of any individual configuration of players is practically zero. The stationary state, however, may be highly concentrated on an ensemble consisting of one Nash configuration and its small perturbations, i.e., configurations, where most players play the same strategy. Such configurations have relatively high probability in the stationary state. We call such configurations ensemble stable.
, where 0 is the center of the square Λ.
Definition 5 X ∈ Ω Λ is low-noise ensemble stable if for every ǫ > 0 there exists T (ǫ) such that if T < T (ǫ), then X is ǫ-ensemble stable.
If X is ensemble stable with ǫ close to zero, then the ensemble consisting of X and configurations which are different from X at at most few sites has the probability close to one in the stationary state. It does not follow, however, that X is necessarily low-noise ensemble or stochastically stable as it happens in Example 5.
Let us begin with the following example.
Example 4
Players are located on a finite subset Λ of Z 2 (a square centered at the origin of the lattice) and interact with their four nearest neighbors. They have at their disposal three pure strategies:
A, B, and C. The payoffs are given by the following symmetric matrix:
The stage game has three Nash equilibria, (A, A), (B, B), and (C, C), and the corresponding spatial game has three homogeneous Nash configurations: X A , X B , and X C .
The unique stationary state of log-linear dynamics (2) is is given by the following formula:
It follows that lim
, C so all three Nash equilibria are stochastically stable. Let us investigate the long-run behavior of our system for large Λ, that is for a big number of players. Observe that lim Λ→Z 2 µ T Λ (X) = 0 for every X ∈ Ω = S Z 2 . Hence for large Λ and T > 0 we may only observe, with reasonable positive frequencies, ensembles of configurations and not particular configurations. We will be interested in ensembles which consist of a Nash configuration and its small perturbations, that is configurations, where most players adopt the same strategy. We will perform first the limit Λ → Z 2 and obtain a Gibbs
We will show in Appendix A that
and ǫ(T ) → 0 as T → 0. The following theorem is a simple consequence of the above inequality.
Theorem 1 X C is low-noise ensemble stable.
We see that for any low but fixed T , if the number of players is big enough, then in the long run, almost all players use C strategy. On the other hand, if for any fixed number of players, T is lowered substantially, then all three strategies appear with frequencies close to 1/3.
Let us sketch briefly the reason of such a behavior. While it is true that all three Nash configurations have the same potential which is the half of the payoff of the whole system (it plays the role of the total energy of a system of interacting particles), the X C Nash configuration has more lowest-cost excitations. Namely, one player can change its strategy and switch to either A or B and the total payoff will decrease by 8 units. Players in the X A Nash configuration have only one possibility, that is to switch to C; switching to B decreases the total payoff by 32 (players in the X B Nash configuration are in the analogous situation). Now, the probability of the occurrence of any configuration in the Gibbs state (which is the stationary state of our stochastic dynamics) depends on the total payoff in an exponential way. One can prove that the probability of the ensemble consisting of the X C Nash configuration and configurations which are different from it at few sites only is much bigger than the probability of the analogous X A and X B ensembles. It means that for large enough systems (and small but not extremely small T ) we observe in the stationary state the X C Nash configuration with perhaps few different strategies. The above argument was made into a rigorous proof for infinite systems of corresponding lattice-gas models of interacting particles by Bricmont and Slawny in [16] . They call X C a dominant ground-state configuration. We will recall their proof in Appendix A.
In the above example, all three Nash configurations, X A , X B , and X C have the same total payoff. X C has lowest-cost fluctuations and therefore it is low-noise ensemble stable. We will now discuss the situation, where X C has a smaller total payoff but nevertheless in the long run C is played with a frequency close to 1 if the noise level is low but not extremely low. We will consider a family of games with the following payoff matrix:
where α > 0 so B is both payoff and globally risk-dominant.
We are interested in the long-run behavior of our system for small positive α and low T .
One may modify the proof of Theorem 1 (see Appendix B) and obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 2 For every ǫ > 0, there exist α(ǫ) and T (ǫ) such that for every 0 < α < α(ǫ), there exists T (α) such that for T (α) < T < T (ǫ), X C is ǫ-ensemble stable, and for 0 < T < T (α),
Observe that for α = 0, both X B and X C are stochastically stable (they appear with the frequency 1/2 in the limit of zero noise) but X C is low-noise ensemble stable. For small α > 0, X B is both stochastically (it appears with the frequency 1 in the limit of zero noise) and lownoise ensemble stable. However, for intermediate noise T (α) < T < T (ǫ), if the number of players is big enough, then in the long run, almost all players use C strategy -X C is ensemble stable). If we lower T below T (α), then almost all players start to use B strategy. We may say that at T = T (α) the society of players undergoes a phase transition from C to B-behavior.
We have seen that a configuration may be stochastically stable but not low-noise ensemble stable. It is easy to see that in the case of potential games every low-noise ensemble stable configuration is stochastically stable. It might not be true for games without a potential; for partial results see [18] .
Dominated Strategies and Equilibrium Selection
Here we will consider games with a strictly dominated strategy and two symmetric pure Nash equilibria. As we know, strictly dominated strategies cannot be present in any Nash equilibrium.
Therefore such strategies should not be used by players and consequently we might think that their presence should not have any impact on the equilibrium selection. We will show in the following examples that this may not be necessarily true.
Example 6
A B C A 0 0.1 1
where α > 0.
We see that strategy A is strictly dominated by both B and C. In the absence of A, B is both payoff and risk-dominant and therefore is stochastically stable and low-noise ensemble stable.
Adding the strategy A does not change dominance relations; B is still payoff and globally risk dominant. However, Theorem 2 tells us that X C is ǫ-ensemble stable at intermediate noise levels. The mere presence of the dominated strategy A changes the long-run behavior of the system. Similar results were already discussed in adaptive games of Myatt and Wallace [19] .
In such games, at every discrete moment of time, one of the agents leaves the population and is replaced by another one who plays the best response. He calculates his best response with respect to his own payoff matrix which is the matrix of a common average payoff disturbed by a realization of some random variable with the zero mean. The noise does not appear in the game as a result of players' mistakes but is the effect of their idiosyncratic preferences. The authors then show that the presence of a strictly dominated strategy may change the stochastic stability of equilibria. In our models, players really make mistakes -they are subject to "traditional" perturbed best-response dynamics.
Here we considered only potential games. We speculate that in games without potential it may happen that A is strictly dominated by B but not by C, B is payoff and globally risk-dominant but nevertheless X C is low-noise ensemble stable.
Discussion
We have discussed effects of the number of players on the long-run behavior in stochastic models of adaptive games. In particular, we were concerned with two limits of our models. In the first one, for a fixed number of players, one considers arbitrarily low level of noise (mistakes or mutations). Then the relevant concept is that of stochastic stability. However, we think that in realistic models we should retain noise. For a fixed level of noise, if the number of players is sufficiently big, it is the limit of the infinite number of players which might better describe its long-run behavior. To formalize this idea, we introduced the concept of ensemble stability.
We show in several examples that the long-run behavior may be different in these two limiting cases.
In particular, we showed limitations of concepts of payoff and global risk-dominance in equlibrium selection in games with many interacting players. We also showed, that the presence of strictly dominated strategies may change the stability of Nash configurations.
We considered here only potential games and used standard tools of statistical physics of interacting particles. The situation is far more complex and interesting in games without a potential. The work in this direction is in progress.
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Appendix A
Here we provide a proof (12) . We follow [16] very closely. We begin by defining formally restricted ensembles. Let Ω = {A, B, C}
be the configuration space of our model.
are the restricted ensemble of configurations of the lowest-cost excitations of X A , X B , and X C Nash configurations. Observe that X C has twice as many lowest-cost excitations as X A and
We define partition functions of restricted ensembles with boundary conditions
where the sum is over X ∈ Ω k R which are equal to Y on Λ c ,
and β = 1/T , where T is the noise level. It is a standard result in rigorous statistical mechanics that a following limit exists
and has a convergent expansion. ψ R (β|k) is called a thermodynamic potential of a gas of noninteracting lowest-cost excitations. We may write
where
and δΛ is the boundary of Λ.
Let X be an excitation of the Nash configuration X A , that is X ∼ X A . We define ret(X) by ret(X)(i) = A if X i = C and X j = A for |i − j| = 1 and retX i = X i otherwise. Therefore, in ret(X) we remove all lowest-cost excitations of X but not excitations of higher cost. If X ∈ Ω A R then ret(X) = X. Let X be such that ret(X) = X. Its boundary is the set of pairs (i, j) such
is the maximal connected subset of the boundary of X. The cost of γ is
Now we define large-scale contours. Let L(β) = e 5β/2 . We cover Z 2 with squares
where B(o) is the square of side L(β) centered at the origin and containing e 5β lattice sites.
We call B(i) a regular box of X if X B(i) ∈ Ω C R,B(i) and it is irregular otherwise. There are two types of irregular boxes of X: 
where the sum is over X ∈ Ω which are equal to
where χ Λ (X) = 1 if Γ is a contour of X and zero otherwise. Therefore
where the sum is over X ∈ Ω which are equal to Y on Λ c and contain Γ. P Γ (•|Y ) is called a Gibbs measure in Λ with boundary conditions Y . Now we are ready to formulate our main proposition.
Proposition 1 For big enough β there exists c such that for all finite
Proof: First we condition on strategies in δ[Γ],
Then we get
where the first summation is over all possible families Γ 2 of type-2 squares of Γ and the second over families ω of small-scale contours in [Γ] such that for each square of Γ 2 there is a contour of ω intersecting the square. Let
be the decomposition of [Γ] − [ω] into connected components. Now we have
and X a is the configuration on δM a .
After inserting (25) into (24) and (24) into (23) we have to estimate the ratio
where in the dominator we used the lower bound
We write the volume terms of (27) as e β( a |Ma|ψ R (β|k(a))−|Γ|ψ R (β|C)) ≤ e 
We obtain that
where the sum over the families ω of small scale-contours is restricted by the condition that for each B ∈ Γ there exists at least one contour γ ∈ ω with [γ] ∩ B = ∅. We get 
From (34) 
We conclude the proof by using the above estimate in (33). Proof: We change boundary conditions from an arbitrary Y to C. We have
We connect disconnected parts of Γ through δΛ and from Proposition 1 we get
which finishes our proof.
Proof of (12):
By Proposition 2 we may assume that Γ covers a small part of Λ. Indeed, with high probability we have |Γ| = e 5β ||Γ|| ≤ O(e 5β )|δΛ|.
In the complement of [Γ] we have the gas of noninteracting lowest-cost excitations of X C which are very rare if β is large enough so the noise level T = 1/β is low enough. This proves that there is the unique limit lim Λ→Z 2 P Λ (•|Y ) which is equal to µ T in (11) and (12) is established.
Appendix B
The payoff of X B in Example 5 is bigger than that of X C . However, for small α, X C has again larger thermodynamic potential. Thermodynamic potentials of lowest-cost excitations have following expansions:
βψ R (β|A) = 1.5 + e −2β + O(e −4β ),
βψ R (β|B) = 2 + α + e −4(1+α)β + O(e −8(1+α)β ).
βψ R (β|C) = 2 + 2e −4β + O(e −8β ).
If α < 1 2 e −4β , then
For A-restricted ensemble we have a trivial estimate β(ψ R (β|C) − ψ R (β|A)) > 0. 4 (44) if β is large enough.
Now to prove Theorem 2 we may repeat the proof of Theorem 1.
